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      <title>Certified: abusing AD CS (ESC9)</title>
      <link>https://bstell.ing/writeups/certified/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://bstell.ing/writeups/certified/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;A write-up of the HackTheBox machine &amp;ldquo;Certified&amp;rdquo;. This box revolves around a vulnerable certificate template that we can abuse to achieve Domain Admin privileges.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id=&#34;the-target&#34;&gt;The target&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;[Placeholder: platform and machine name (HackTheBox &amp;ldquo;Certified&amp;rdquo;) and difficulty rating.]&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The host is a domain controller for &lt;code&gt;certified.htb&lt;/code&gt;, and we are handed one working account, &lt;code&gt;judith.mader&lt;/code&gt;. The objective is the built-in &lt;code&gt;Administrator&lt;/code&gt;. In outline the path runs from that account, through ownership of a group, to a service account, and finally to the certificate authority, where a misconfigured template lets us issue ourselves a certificate in the Administrator&amp;rsquo;s name.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Eighteen: exploiting BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779)</title>
      <link>https://bstell.ing/writeups/eighteen/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://bstell.ing/writeups/eighteen/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;A write-up of the HackTheBox machine &amp;ldquo;Eighteen&amp;rdquo;. This box revolves around turning application password hashes into an Active Directory foothold, then looks at the dMSA privilege-escalation path that Windows Server 2025 introduced.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id=&#34;the-target&#34;&gt;The target&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;[Placeholder: platform and machine name (HackTheBox &amp;ldquo;Eighteen&amp;rdquo;) and difficulty rating.]&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The host is a domain controller for &lt;code&gt;eighteen.htb&lt;/code&gt; (&lt;code&gt;DC01&lt;/code&gt;), and we are given one SQL Server login, &lt;code&gt;kevin&lt;/code&gt;. Three TCP services are exposed: an IIS site on 80, SQL Server 2022 on 1433, and WinRM on 5985. DNS on 53/udp confirms the domain controller role. The path runs from the SQL login, through an application database and the password hashes stored in it, to a domain account reachable over WinRM, and from there toward a delegated managed service account (dMSA) escalation specific to Server 2025.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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